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Introduction 
 
“There have been frustrations on the part of the 
AU [African Union] and the international 
community with the slow pace of tackling this 
issue [addressing the issue of peace in South 
Sudan]. They made a correct decision to place the 
responsibility for dealing with the conflict on IGAD 
[Intergovernmental Authority on Development]. 
That is because if you do not have the region 
involved then you will not have a successful peace 
process. But this region is made up of countries 
with quite separate national interests. This is part 
of the difficulty the region faces in intervening as 
one unified actor.” 
 
Nicholas Haysom, UN Special Envoy for 
Sudan and South Sudan1 
 
The above quote succinctly captures a well-
known conundrum on the role of regional actors 
for peace in their immediate geographic 
neighborhood. More often than not, regional 
actors project the international community with 
a paradoxical choice of being unavoidable actors 
for peace and that of spoilers.  Recent global and 
regional peace making and peacekeeping 
endeavors are rife with illustrations of this 
conundrum. The conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo in the 1990s is an apt 
illustration of how the interest of countries in the 
region played out not just in exacerbating the 
conflict but increasingly in convoluting 
successive efforts for peace. More recently, 
South Sudan’s tragic experience bore out the 
tension between the respective national interests 
of neighbors and collective policy actions and 
decisions at sub-regional, regional, and global 
platforms for peace. Evidently, the interests and 
threats considerations of countries in the region 
were at logger heads with each other in some 
instances, with the ultimate consequence of 
 
1 Institute for Security Studies (ISS). PSC Interview: Nicholas 
Haysom, UN Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. 16 August 
2018. Available on https://issafrica.org/pscreport/addis-
insights/psc-interview-nicholas-haysom-un-special-envoy-for-sudan-
and-south-
sudan?utm_source=BenchmarkEmail&utm_campaign=PSC_Report
&utm_medium=email. 
impacting the quest for peace in the country. 
Without mentioning names, UNSG Antonio 
Guterees lately alluded to this challenge by 
stating that “recent experience has illustrated 
that regional interests and proximity to the 
parties can also complicate conflict 
prevention and resolution efforts”. (UNSC, 
2018, § 54). 
 
Against this broad background, this research 
report focuses on the issue of neighborhood 
peacekeeping interventions, specifically 
examining the impact of neighboring 
countries’ interests and intervention on 
peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. The 
central question this paper engages with is 
how and why do countries intervene in a 
neighbor, in this particular case in South 
Sudan and, following the outbreak of the 2013 
crisis, how did their interventions impact the 
peacekeeping mission in the country?   
 
Within the existing academic and policy 
literature, the peacekeeping roles of countries 
neighboring conflict zones has assumed 
varied dimensions. In the UN peacekeeping 
policy discourse, the prevailing view had been 
that of reluctance to the participation of 
neighboring countries in UN peacekeeping 
missions. In this regard, Paul Williams and 
Thong Gguyen (2018, p.1) stated the 
prevalence of “unwritten principle that UN 
peacekeeping missions should seek to avoid 
deployment of troops or police from 
‘neighbors’ in order to mitigate the risks 
associated with these countries’ national 
interests in the host countries”. From a 
normative dimension, this general attitude 
stems from neighbors’ difficulty to maintain 
the principle of impartiality in their conduct in 
host countries as the former presumably may 
have their own national interests. As one of 
the core UN peacekeeping tenets, impartiality 
refers to the expectation that peacekeepers 
should be unbiased and undiscriminating 
towards conflict parties. 
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Nevertheless, this long-standing view appears to 
have been challenged by and increasingly re-
examined due to a number of factors. Chief 
among them is the changing global peace and 
security dynamics which necessitated the 
emergence and the ascendance in the relevance 
of regional peacekeeping missions, especially in 
Africa. Peacekeeping missions such as AMISOM 
and AFISMA/MINUSMA attested to the 
inevitability and relative significance of troop and 
police contributions from countries neighboring 
crisis zones. Within these missions, troops from 
the neighboring countries operate in terrains that 
they are familiar with and they increasingly 
proved to be more committed to take more risk 
including heavy causalities. Further, these troops 
were often strategically deployed or positioned 
to prevent the spillover effects of the conflict to 
the home country, thereby serving key national 
interest considerations. 
 
At the same time, the growing roles of neighbors 
in peacekeeping by itself had generated its own 
debates. In the case of the UN, the debate 
focused, for example, on whether or not the UN 
should “increase the number of peacekeepers 
drawn from countries neighboring the host state” 
(Williams & Nguyen, 2018, p.1).  
The flip side/converse of this debate touches 
upon how the disparate interventions of 
neighboring countries in conflicts in their vicinity 
affect ongoing peacekeeping missions in those 
specific contexts. 
 
This study examines this puzzle based on both 
fieldwork and desk review of pertinent literature 
focusing on Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. 
To this broad end, the study accomplished two 
major objectives: analyzing patterns in the 
regional interests in South Sudan before and 
during South Sudan crisis and subsequently 
examining the impact of divergent regional 
interests on the peacekeeping mission.2 
Based on its findings, the study furthers the 
following set of arguments.  
 
Alignment of regional interests in South 
Sudan took a different turn following the 
outbreak of the 2013 South Sudan crisis. 
Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda which were 
hitherto historically united by shared support 
to southern independence had failed to 
realign their respective national interest 
considerations with that of a collective quest 
for peace in South Sudan. The divergence of 
regional interests in South Sudan is mainly 
due to the overt partisan positions of Uganda 
and to a lesser extent Sudan in the 2013 civil 
war. Contending interests of these two 
countries in the South Sudan conflict defined 
the positions of the conflict parties both in the 
course of the conflict and later during the 
regional mediation process. Divergence of 
regional interests in South Sudan had a direct 
consequence of prolonging the resolution of 
South Sudan civil war. Parties to the conflict 
leveraged lack of common regional position 
to reject or delay implementation of 
provisions of major peace agreement(s). Its 
specific impact on peacekeeping include 
weakening the overall function of the 
mission(s) to the extent that peace missions 
are conceived to be ultimately operating 
towards an overarching political goal (which 
took quite some time to establish in the case 
of South Sudan). Interest-based engagements 
and involvement in South Sudan also 
impacted the timeline of deployment and 
troop composition of the peacekeeping 
mission, especially the Regional Protection 
Force (RPF) in South Sudan. One clear 
consequence is the exclusion of some of the 
neighboring countries analyzed in this study 
(Uganda and Sudan) and consequently in 
watering down the political will and appetite 
 
2 This report covered the peacekeeping and peacemaking 
dynamics in South Sudan up to mid 2018 and doesn’t reflect the 
developments that unfolded afterwards. 
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to deploy the RPF. The RPF was deployed when 
the idea behind its authorization had significantly 
lost its momentum. These observations point to 
the need to find ways of ‘early enough’ 
constructive engagement of neighbors in 
creative and contextually rooted peacekeeping 
policies. Among other things, these policies shall 
balance on the one hand the self-interests of 
countries in the neighborhood and the collective 
regional quest for peace in a given context on 
the other hand. 
 
In terms of the structure of this report, part one 
offers a brief background analysis as well as 
conflict dynamics of South Sudan. This part 
focuses mainly on the historical analysis of the 
engagement of selected frontline countries in 
South Sudan and their motivation to do so, 
especially in the period immediately predating 
the establishment of the country as an 
independent entity. This analysis helps us to 
foreground the discussion on subsequent 
intervention of South Sudan’s neighbors during 
and in the aftermath of the 2013 civil war. 
 
Part two examines the modes of interventions 
and the underlying threat analysis and other 
national interest-based considerations of each 
neighbor following the outbreak of the South 
Sudan conflict. Part three is dedicated to 
analyzing the impact of neighbors’ intervention 
and interest on peacekeeping missions in South 
Sudan. To this end, this part will examine if and 
how neighbors’ interventions affected the 
objective of peacekeeping missions in South 
Sudan. It will also shed light on ways of 
constructively transforming the potential 
adverse impacts of the unavoidable intervention 
of key front-line states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part One 
 
Against the backdrop of years of deep-rooted 
political wrangling and party in-fighting, gun 
fights erupted in Juba in December 2013 
between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir 
and the then Vice President Riek Machar. The 
government claimed it was thwarting an 
attempted coup that was in the making under 
the brinkmanship of Riek Machar. The fighting 
was followed by ethnic based attacks and 
counter-attacks, including on civilians in 
different parts of the country. Increasingly, the 
fighting spread to different parts of South 
Sudan and at one point the country’s territory 
was divided between government and rebel 
forces. Political wrangling including the 
detention of high-level officials accompanied 
the military confrontations. All of these 
constitute what is considered in this study as 
the South Sudan civil war.  
 
At its core, the South Sudan civil war is 
considered a deep political and security crisis 
with a very strong ethnic undertone. Citing 
commentators such as John Prendergast, 
Alex de Waal (2015, p.91) attributed the 
outbreak of the crisis, though to a lesser 
extent, “to political and personal rivalries, 
ethnic animosity between the Dinka and the 
Nuer tribes of the two major protagonists (of 
Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, respectively), and 
the internecine wars among South Sudanese 
factions in the 1990s”. While valuing these 
factors as real, de Waal credited a higher 
significance to causation of the crisis to what 
he calls the “elemental contest over buying 
loyalties”.3 On its part, the AU Commission of 
Inquiry on South Sudan (2014, p.20) point to 
failure of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) as a root cause of the crisis 
stating that “the current conflict can be 
 
3 This refers to existing trend in South Sudan as well as in the 
Horn of Africa region in which governance operate on exchange 
of personal transaction of political services and allegiances for 
material reward (de Waal, 2015). 
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attributed, in part, to the flaws of the CPA (in 
terms of process and outcomes) as well as its 
implementation.” 
 
The above suggests that as most other 
contemporary crises, South Sudan’s civil war is 
indeed complex, multi-causal, pluri-actor, and 
dynamically evolving. It also suggests that it is a 
crisis that is both historically rooted as well as 
driven by and grounded in contemporary realities 
of the country. While South Sudanese ‘agency’ is 
a key driver of the conflict, regional actors and 
responses have significantly shaped South 
Sudan’s still-evolving civil war. This forces us to 
note how national and regional interests have 
intertwined and increasingly complicated 
regional and even trans-regional interventions 
and responses to the crisis.  
 
As the South Sudan crisis lingered, countries in 
the region were constantly looking for ways that 
safeguard their respective strategic interests. 
Increasingly, it became very evident that 
competing regional interests had exacerbated 
the crisis, adding to its complexity (Kuol, 2018). It 
appears self-interest of neighbors had prevailed 
over pursuit of collective goals in South Sudan. 
However, this sharply contrasts with the role 
some of South Sudan’s neighbors had played 
historically in supporting the self-determination 
pursuit of southern-based groups and in 
enabling the establishment of the country as an 
independent nation. This section and the coming 
one will chronicle these competing stories. 
 
Neighbors’ interests, motivations, and 
interventions in South Sudan: Early 1990’s and 
up to 2013  
 
In the lead up to the 2011 South Sudan 
referendum, the Norwegian Peace Research of 
Oslo (PRIO) conducted an analysis of the 
interests and motivation of some of the 
countries in the region. The analysis concluded 
that the neighboring countries have a clear 
interest in contributing towards a peaceful 
transition in the Sudan (Høigilt, Falch & 
Rolandsen, 2010). PRIO’s analysis seems to 
be echoing an earlier conclusion done by the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in 2008 
which stated of a shared interest in “creating 
peace” within IGAD as a regional bloc. The 
latter attributed IGAD’s desire for peace in 
Sudan as driven by a transversal set of 
factors. These factors included maintaining 
regional security, preventing spillover effects 
into neighboring nations, developing the 
economy in order to expand trading 
relationships, and developing internal national 
resources to stimulate economic growth, 
refugee and humanitarian, assistance in order 
to bring an end to the devastation caused by 
the civil war (Schafer, 2007). These analyses 
are correct to large extent but apply only to 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, albeit some 
nuances. They are correct in the sense of 
expressing a shared end state among the key 
IGAD member states (i.e. to see peace in 
Sudan) as well as in capturing their drivers or 
motivations therein. Importantly, these three 
countries all had a demonstrable leaning 
towards supporting the south’s quest for self-
determination, though each country prioritized 
certain prerogatives over others to justify its 
strategic inclination. In contrast, Sudan had a 
diametrically opposite interest vis-à-vis the 
others emanating from its desire to prevent 
the impending secession of the South and to 
exert its influence in its immediate 
neighborhood. The ensuing sections provide a 
country-by-country analysis of the interests, 
motivations, and modes of engagement of 
these countries.  
 
1.1. Uganda 
 
Uganda had a deep and multifaceted 
historical engagement with the South. In the 
context of the long-standing civil war in 
Sudan, Uganda had maintained consistent but 
unequivocal stance on the issue of the South. 
As such, it was rightly considered as “one of 
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the SPLA’s most ardent supporters during the 
war’’ (International Crisis Group, 2010, p.5) and 
later as the most unambiguous supporter of 
independence. Uganda had historically matched 
its professed support for the South with diverse 
forms of practical engagements covering 
diplomacy, military, and other dimensions. In the 
1980’s, Uganda provided diplomatic support in 
lobbying around ground realities in the South as 
well as offered clandestine military support to 
SPLM. The latter gave way to open financial and 
military assistance as well as direct involvement 
in operations alongside the SPLA, whose fighters 
moved back and forth across the border and 
were allowed both an operating base and a 
political platform in Uganda (ICG, 2010b).  
 
With the signing of the CPA and the 
establishment of the Government of Southern 
Sudan (GoSS), Uganda continued its strategic 
engagement with the South through institutional 
and military capacity building, including training 
of civil servants in the Southern Sudan (Høigilt, 
Falch & Rolandsen, 2010). According to Høigilt, 
Falch and Rolandsen (2010), Uganda’s 
expanding engagement in Southern Sudan was 
driven by two major considerations: one 
emanating from Kampala’s security-based threat 
analysis and the other from socio-political and 
economic interests. 
 
In the late 1980s and 1990s various rebel groups 
that used to operate in different parts of the 
country made up Uganda’s major security 
concerns. While groups such as the West Nile 
Bank Front and the Allied Democratic Forces 
were militarily challenging the Ugandan 
government, the LRA was arguably the most 
prominent one projecting a major threat to 
Uganda. Undeniably, LRA was receiving strong 
military support and assistance from Sudan, 
presumably in retaliation to Uganda’s continued 
support to the SPLA. With the tacit knowledge 
and support from Khartoum, the LRA used to 
operate from military bases located in the 
current territories of South Sudan. As the 
prospects of an independent state loomed 
larger, Uganda saw in South Sudan the 
prospect of a friendly country which could 
serve as a buffer effectively blocking the LRA 
threat. The SPLA had tried to live up to 
Uganda’s expectation in that regard. The 
nascent GoSS established following the CPA 
was involved in peacemaking efforts between 
Uganda and the LRA. Importantly, the GoSS 
also allowed Ugandan soldiers to operate in 
its territory hunting the LRA as early as 2008 
and itself dedicated four brigades to 
cooperate in the LRA hunt.4 These security-
based considerations were emblematic of an 
existing trend of the time in which relations 
among countries in the region were marked 
by deep-seated suspicion, rivalry and 
strategies of mutual destabilization. As a key 
feature of this trend, countries in the region 
were involved in proxy wars against each 
other, mainly through arming and harboring of 
rebel groups.   
 
Linked with its security interest, certain 
political considerations foregrounded the 
uneasy relationship between Khartoum and 
Kampala that marks the early 1990s. In part, 
an extension of the security predicaments 
discussed above, the two countries were 
harboring deep-seated mistrust against each 
other (Høigilt, Falch & Rolandsen, 2010). For 
Kampala, the increasing influence of political 
Islamism in Khartoum and Sudan’s attempt to 
project the same southward was rather 
unsettling. This was largely perceived as a 
move to spread Islamization and even 
Arabization in the region. Khartoum, on its 
part, was not happy with Uganda’s all-rounded 
support to the rebellion in its southern region. 
 
4 The GoSS contribution to these campaigns include the SPLA’s 
Second Division, elements of the 9th Brigade (Eastern 
Equatoria), the 7th Brigade (Central Equatoria), the 8th Brigade 
(Western Equatoria); and from the 5th Division, including the 
43rd Brigade (Western Bahr El Ghazal). The SPLA has also 
armed local defence units (“arrow-boys”) to assist in repelling 
the LRA in Western Equatoria. Its engagement is largely 
oriented toward civilian protection, not pursuit. See International 
Crisis Group Africa Report N°157, LRA: A Regional Strategy 
beyond Killing Kony, 28 April 2010. 
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Further, Uganda’s close ties with the political and 
military elites of the South did not bode well with 
Khartoum. As a net effect of these and other 
factors, the two countries had severed their 
diplomatic relations in mid-1990s and despite a 
degree of rapprochement since, their relationship 
had remained comparatively weak as late as 
2010 (ICG, 2010a).  
 
Kampala’s relation with what was to become 
South Sudan was also shaped by social and 
cultural links between the Sudan’s southern 
territory and Uganda. As many post-colonial 
countries, ethnic communities straddle the 
border and it was not uncommon to find Acholis, 
Kakwas, Langos, Madis, and others in both 
countries (ICG, 2010b). These shared ethnic 
forms of kinship were further buttressed by other 
societal interactions, notably by history of 
hosting each other’s refugees. According to ICG 
(2010b), Uganda had been hosting many 
refugees from the South who were fleeing from 
the civil wars. Ugandans had also sought 
sanctuary in the South, especially after the fall of 
Idi Amin and during recurrent bouts of conflict 
between government forces and the LRA in 
Northern Uganda.  
 
Economic interests, which later became 
dominant variables in shaping Uganda’s relation 
with the South, were not that much prominent in 
the period preceding the signing of the CPA 
agreement. This wouldn’t come as a surprise 
after all. Previously, naturally endowed and 
lucrative as it was, the South had little to offer in 
terms of business opportunities for Ugandans’ 
as an economically disfranchised region of the 
Sudan and given Khartoum’s strong sphere of 
influence. But this was to dramatically change 
following the establishment of the semi-
autonomous administration of the South in 
2006, driven by two main factors. Relative 
stability in the South following the CPA 
implementation introduced some level of 
normalcy in the lives of many southerners. This 
had immediate economic consequence in the 
form of increased trading activities, not least 
due to demands for goods, which were readily 
supplied by Ugandan traders (Titeca cited in 
Høigilt, Falch & Rolandsen, 2010). Bilateral 
trade between Uganda and South Sudan 
appears to have grown by 1 000 percent 
between 2006 and 2008 (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics cited in Appuli, 2014). As part of this 
trend, South Sudan bought 20 percent of 
Uganda’s export goods, making it Uganda’s 
largest customer since 2006 (Koos and 
Gutschke, 2014). By 2008, South Sudan 
became Uganda’s largest export markets with 
Kampala’s official export totaling USD 260 
million per year and informal export estimated 
to be USD 170 million per month (Høigilt, 
Falch & Rolandsen, 2010). Accordingly, during 
the Interim Period (2005–2011), Uganda 
emerged as South Sudan’s largest trading 
partner: its exports were worth US$187 in 
2010 (Le Riche and Arnold, 2012).  
 
As we are to see later, Uganda’s economic 
interest would become much more prominent 
with the emergence of infrastructure projects 
such as highways connecting the two 
countries and notably with the increase in 
Ugandan citizens residing in South Sudan. As 
Juba started to share part of oil the revenues 
with Khartoum, individual investments by 
Ugandans started to flourish. In addition, the 
two countries (along with Kenya and 
Rwanda), were also exploring ways of building 
refinery or pipeline that serve them all 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics cited in Appuli, 
2014). 
 
Uganda’s all-rounded interests and 
engagements in the South had ebbed and 
flowed throughout the years, notably during 
the second civil war in the South; the CPA 
negotiations and the establishment of the 
semi-autonomous GoSS; and in the interim 
period before the outbreak of the 2013 crisis. 
Some links such as the social and cultural ties 
were long lasting and could be considered 
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generally immutable for the major part all along. 
In contrast, economic interests, which were 
insignificant, rose to preeminence after 2006. 
The threat from LRA and its ability to operate 
from South Sudan significantly waned in the 
2000s as compared to its peak in the 1990s. 
However, one variable appears to be a major 
‘constant’ in defining Uganda’s relation with the 
South and still remains potent today, namely the 
‘Museveni factor’.   
 
President Yoweri Museveni has been ruling 
Uganda since 1986 and he has been a major 
provider of policy direction to shape the 
relationship between the two countries (ICG, 
2010a, 2010b). Some may discount his role as 
megalomaniac in many regards, given his 
personalized approach to politics in the region 
including in South Sudan. There is, however, an 
ideological underpinning to his long-standing 
leaning towards the South and conversely to his 
possible apathy/long-standing suspicion of 
Khartoum. Yoweri Museveni was considered as 
among the new breed of leaders in the 1990s 
who managed to become the darlings of the 
Western world. At the same time, many believe 
that he considers himself as a Pan Africanist 
who viewed the issues of South Sudan through 
the prism of ‘Africans versus Arabs’.5 Others also 
allege that his personal friendship with the late 
John Garang was important in explaining his 
leaning to the southern cause.6 In their early 
years, the two leaders had studied together at 
Makrere University, Uganda and both later 
become leaders of liberation movement in their 
countries. No matter the true source of the exact 
motivation and intent, the personal role of Yoweri 
Museveni is pivotal today as it was in the past in 
terms of understanding the factors that 
influenced the relation between the two 
countries. 
 
 
 
5 Interview with a South Sudanese scholar, Juba, July 5, 2018. 
6 Interview with a researcher at an international think tank, Juba, 
July 6, 2018. 
1.2. Ethiopia 
 
As a country which underwent different 
regime changes with evident policy 
departures, Ethiopia’s interest in and 
engagement with South Sudan need to be 
contextualized and understood within 
different periods. Emperor Haile Selassie was 
credited for facilitating the Addis Ababa 
Agreement in 1972, which ended the First 
Sudanese Civil War. At one level, this could be 
considered as an attempt to remain a neutral 
arbitrator in the crisis.  
 
This was to give way later to an overt partisan 
engagement with Sudan in the 1980’s when 
Ethiopia was ruled by Mengistu Hailemariam. 
This time around, Ethiopia was openly lending 
its support to SPLA, although “its alleged 
support to Sudanese dissidents pre-dating the 
SPLA began in the 1976” (Johnson cited in 
ICG, 2010b, p. 12). Rather than a country 
anomaly, however, Ethiopia’s support to SPLA 
need to be understood as part of a prevailing 
region-wide trend of the time in which most 
countries in the region were in constant proxy 
war against each other. In this case, 
Khartoum was supporting different insurgent 
groups which were fighting to topple the 
military regime in Ethiopia. Ethiopia retaliated 
to this by providing extensive and crucial 
support including bases, training, political 
direction, weapons and other supplies (ICG, 
2010b). Furthermore, Ethiopia allowed the 
SPLA to establish a military base in Gambella 
and a political office in Addis Ababa.  
 
Ethiopia’s support to the SPLA ceased, 
although transiently, in the early 1990s when 
the EPRDF led government came to power 
and there are two competing explanations for 
that. Some attribute that Ethiopia had 
embarked on a recalibration of its foreign 
policy orientation that included ending its 
proxy conflicts with its neighbors and not 
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supporting insurgent groups in the region.7 
Others allege that the new regime in Ethiopia 
withdrew its support to SPLA as the new regime 
considered the SPLA to had been close to 
Mengistu and was employed in his strategy 
against EPRDF (ICG, 2010b). None of these two 
explanations are potent in the longer term as 
Ethiopia soon resumed its support to SPLA not 
long before mid-1990s.  
 
The EPRDF led government had made 
rapprochement efforts with Khartoum in the 
early 1990s. According to ICG (2010b, p. 12), this 
included following a deliberate policy to contain 
“the danger posed by the National Islamic Front 
(NIF) – an increasingly expansionist Islamic 
regime with an international agenda – that had 
consolidated its grip in Khartoum and was 
pursuing destabilizing activities in the region, 
thus threatening Ethiopian security”. 
Nevertheless, the assassination attempt on 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis 
Ababa by Islamists supported by Sudan, was an 
important milestone influencing Ethiopia’s 
rapprochement with the Sudan and 
consequently with the SPLA.  
 
In the aftermath of the assassination attempt, 
Ethiopia renewed its support to the SPLA to 
offset Sudan’s political influence in the region, 
particularly as it was wary of the expansion of 
Islamists in the region. Ethiopian forces were 
alleged to have fought battles with government 
forces inside Sudan in the 1990’s as part of 
campaigns intended to change the behavior of 
the Khartoum government (ICG, 2010b). 
Following the 1998 Ethio-Eritrea war, Ethiopia 
improved its relations with Khartoum and 
increasingly established economic and business 
ties. Thaw in estranged relation between Addis 
and Khartoum was nonetheless unfolding 
parallel with Ethiopia’s implicit support to the 
IGAD led negotiation which aimed, among 
others, to ensure the self-determination of the 
 
7 Interview with an Ethiopian diplomat, July 16, 2018, Addis Ababa. 
South. At this juncture, it is important to raise 
the underlying national interests and threat 
considerations that shaped Ethiopia’s 
engagement with the South within the 
different periods. 
 
As highlighted earlier, from the perspective of 
threat analysis, Ethiopia was guided by the 
need to counterbalance Khartoum’s support 
to insurgencies vying to unseat or militarily 
contest successive regimes in Addis Ababa. 
This was more evident during the military 
regime and evinced by its support to SPLA 
which reciprocated Khartoum’s backing to the 
various rebel forces which were fighting the 
military regime. Following the downfall of the 
military regime, a similar consideration 
prevailed both to counter the threat of 
Islamists and to pre-empt Sudan from 
offering similar support to Ethiopia’s rebels. 
This time Ethiopia tried to balance its 
engagement with the Khartoum with that of 
SPLA. The IGAD led negotiation provided an 
opportune platform to maintain that difficult 
equilibrium.  
 
Ethiopia was also wary of the spillover effects 
of the civil war in the southern Sudan, from 
two major dimensions. A continuation of the 
civil war in the South had an obvious 
humanitarian consequence as it was 
generating a recurrent refugee crisis. From 
humanitarian relief perspective, Ethiopia 
simply could not afford the social and 
environmental cost of indefinitely caring for 
refugees from southern Sudan and an 
enduring solution was imperative for the crisis 
across the border. But more seriously, 
Ethiopia also wanted to avert both the social 
and security implications of the civil war in the 
South to the Gambela region.8 This was more 
evident as the refugee influx threatened to 
unsettle the ethnic balance in the Gambella 
 
8 Ethiopia’s Gambella region, home to the Nuer ethnic groups 
and which are also the second populous groups in southern 
Sudan, bore the brunt of these recurrent crisis. 
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region, where the number of the Anuak (a 
hitherto numerically dominant ethnic group) was 
gradually overtaken by the Nuer. Ethnic tensions 
became more regular in the Gambella region in 
part due to demographic changes occasioned by 
refugee influx. While the above was more 
pertinent to Ethiopia’s security interests, Addis 
Ababa has also regional security concerns as it 
did not want the continuation of the Sudan civil 
war, especially “given the volatile situation in 
Somalia, continued confrontation with Eritrea 
and its own domestic fragility” (ICG, 2010b, p.i).” 
 
Economic consideration became only evident in 
the interim period between the establishment of 
the semi-autonomous GoSS and the outbreak of 
the 2013 South Sudan civil war. Though there 
were no official figures, small and medium 
businesses owned by Ethiopians began 
flourishing in search of new business frontiers in 
South Sudan. Almost in a very short duration, 
Ethiopians controlled certain segments of the 
economy in the South notably in the hospitality 
and transport industry. Notwithstanding this, in 
shaping Ethiopia’s engagement with the South, 
economics, though still relevant, was a distant 
fourth behind the security, politics, and social 
factors presented earlier. 
 
1.3. Kenya 
 
Unlike Ethiopia and Uganda whose partiality was 
palpable during the second civil war in the 
southern Sudan, Kenya more or less had 
managed to avoid becoming party to the conflict 
(Hemmer, 2010). At the same time, Kenya’s 
sympathetic position to the ‘southern’ cause was 
also too evident. Kenya thus had managed “to be 
pro-South without being anti-North” (ICG, 2010b, 
p.1). The political support Kenya provided to 
SPLA was an important indication of Kenya’s 
leaning to the South. This was especially critical 
during the brief period when SPLA was expelled 
from Ethiopia in the early 1990s and Kenya 
hosted the SPLA political office. Kenya also gave 
sanctuary to many refugees from the South 
during the multiple stages of the civil war and 
this had created a long-standing people-to- 
people relation with the territory that would 
later become South Sudan. Many southerners 
had lived, studied, and worked in Kenya and 
that trend still continues to date. This social 
link between the two countries was also an 
important element which underlie their 
relation. The two countries had shared ethnic 
ties as communities such as the Toposas, are 
to be found on both sides of their borders.9  
 
A combination of national interest and threat 
considerations had shaped Kenya’s 
engagement in South Sudan in the period 
predating the latter’s independence. In 
general, regional security, socio-political 
considerations and refuge influx underpinned 
Kenya’s lead role in the negotiation of the 
CPA. Insecurity in borderland areas where the 
two countries shared ethnic communities was 
also a longstanding concern. 
 
As in the case of Uganda and Ethiopia, 
Kenya’s economic interest became more 
prominent following the signing of the CPA. 
Nevertheless, some would argue Kenya’s 
economic interest in the South predated that 
period claiming Kenya’s economy had 
benefitted from humanitarian operations in 
the 1990’s intended to Sudan such as 
Operational Lifeline Sudan (OLS).10 Kenya was 
the launching pad for the Operations’ 
Southern Sector and was a hub of the 
numerous NGOs that buttressed the huge 
humanitarian activities. The economic 
rationale of such operations was in terms of 
the employment opportunities it had 
generated for Kenyans in the NGOs sectors as 
well as in terms of some level of economic 
dividend from serving as the launching pad of 
such a huge logistics operation.  
 
 
 
9 Interview with a South Sudan scholar, Juba, July 6, 2018. 
10 Interview with a  South Sudan scholar, Juba, July 6, 2018. 
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Importantly, following the establishment of the 
semi-autonomous GoSS, Kenya’s economic and 
business interests grew extensively. The remit of 
investments by Kenyans in South Sudan 
included banking, insurance, aviation, 
construction, hospitality, information and 
communication technologies (ICT), 
transportation, as well as wholesale and retail 
trade (Odhiambo & Muluvi, 2014). These 
investments created substantial dividends to the 
Kenyan economy, mainly by way of export 
trading and employment opportunities for 
Kenyans in South Sudan. In 2012, Kenyan formal 
exports to South Sudan were valued at 209 
million USD. Shipments to and from South 
Sudan accounted for approximately 12 percent 
of transit traffic at the Mombasa port, an 
increase of 83.8 percent over 2011 (Koos and 
Gutschke, 2014). By 2012, South Sudan became 
an important export destination for Kenya 
accounting for 10.2 percent of Kenyan total 
exports to Common Market for East and 
Southern Africa (COMESA).11 One of the most 
strong indicator of Kenya’s expanding economic 
interest in South Sudan was the plan to develop 
mega infrastructure projects such as the Lamu 
Port-South-Sudan-Ethiopia (LAPSSET) corridor.12 
However, this project, which was expected to 
foster transport linkage between Kenya and its 
neighbors as well as promoting economic 
development for Northern Kenya by boosting 
trade, was clearly threatened by the instability in 
South Sudan (Odhiambo & Muluvi, 2014).  
 
 
 
11 This puts South Sudan as the fourth-largest export destination for 
Kenya out of the 18 other members of COMESA. Exports to the 
COMESA region constitute 34 percent of total Kenyan exports to the 
world.  Kenya Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 2013 cited in 
Odhiambo and Muluvi, 2014. 
12 The LAPSSET corridor, jointly launched in March 2012 by Kenya, 
South Sudan and Ethiopia, involves the construction of a new 
transport corridor from the new Port of Lamu through the Kenyan 
towns of Garissa and Isiolo with one part of the corridor connecting 
Kenya and Ethiopia. The other part of the corridor will connect 
Kenya and South Sudan through Isiolo and border town of Nakodok. 
The LAPSSET project comprises a new road network, a railway line, 
an oil refinery at Lamu, an oil pipeline, airports in Lamu and Isiolo, 
and resort cities in Isiolo and at the shores of Lake Turkana 
(Odhiambo and Muluvi, 2014). 
1.4. Sudan 
 
A focus on no other country than Sudan helps 
more in understanding the regional dynamics 
in South Sudan. This may not come as a 
surprise as South Sudan broke away from 
Sudan and became independent in 2011 
based on the provisions of the CPA. As such, 
for the period predating 2011, it is not 
reasonable to treat the two as separate 
political entities. With this caveat, however, it 
is feasible to broadly analyze Khartoum’s 
interests in its southern territory first for the 
period up to the establishment of a separate 
state in the South and later for the interim 
period up to the outbreak of the 2013 South 
Sudan civil war. In addition, Khartoum’s policy 
was the point of reference against which 
every other country in the region seeks to 
recalibrate its respective engagement.  
 
Sudan got its independence from the British in 
1956 and its territory included current day 
South Sudan. Even before that period, 
southerners were making demands for some 
form of self-rule or independence from the 
British colonialists which had failed to 
respond to these demands. Independent 
Sudan, therefore, had inherited southern 
political demands as disparate as federation, 
different forms of self-rule, and in extreme 
cases sessions claims (Johnson, 2016). Such 
unfulfilled requests were further amplified by 
Khartoum’s evident governance failure to 
properly administer the South, which was 
more and more disfranchised and 
marginalized.  
 
Successive rebellions by southerners, thus 
came in these contexts over claims of 
“unlawful abrogation of a degree of southern 
self-rule that was ensured by the 1972 Addis 
Ababa Agreement, south ward spread of 
pious Islam, economic marginalization as well 
as social discrimination of southerners” (AU 
Commission of Inquiry, 2014, p.18). The CPA, 
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which came at the back of many other preceding 
agreements, protocols, and negotiations,13 was 
an attempt to address the long-standing 
question of (self) governance by ensuring the 
right of self-determination for Southerners.14 
 
Initially, the CPA was by no means conceived 
with the South’s secession as its major and 
strategic end-state. Rather, parties to the 
agreement were offered a ‘grace period’ of six 
years during which time they would strive to 
make unity attractive to southerners (Johnson, 
2016). Nevertheless, the six years were 
unceremoniously spent without accomplishing 
some of the agreements entailed within the CPA, 
either as result of lack of commitment or 
capacity. According to Hilde Johnson (2016), 
this critically tested Khartoum’s seriousness 
about the CPA provisions and more so in the 
face of mounting popular sentiment for 
independence among southerners.  
 
Any meaningful chance of the South’s unity with 
Khartoum was dealt further blow with the death 
of Dr. John Garang, who was championing a 
vision for New Sudan, without necessarily 
advocating for the South’s secession. As Sudan 
got grips with the realities of a looming 
secession of the South, it had to 
unceremoniously reorient its relations with the 
future independent South Sudan. This was, 
nonetheless, based on old tactics of dividing 
southerners and cognizant of new realities such 
as the loss of significant oil revenues and 
territories; ongoing rebellions in the North 
including in Darfur as well as in South Kordofan 
 
13 The CPA began with the Declaration of Principles in 1988 in Koka 
Dam, Ethiopia, but before it was finally concluded in Naivasha, 
Kenya and officially signed in Nairobi on 9 January, 2005, it had 
seen many a negotiation venue: from Abuja, Nigeria, to Machakos, 
Kenya. It was a product of many unrelenting efforts including 
diplomatic and financial support, pressure and threats, by regional 
organizations such as the United Nations, the Inter-Governmental 
Agency on Development (IGAD) and the African Union, as well as 
foreign governments such as the United States, United Kingdom 
and Norway (Jok 2015). 
14 On the other hand, as we are to see later, the Agreement also left 
lingering and follow on issues which perpetuated the new nation’s 
instability and complex relation, both vis a vis Sudan and internally 
among South Sudanese elites. 
and Blue Niles areas. Given such historically 
rooted linkages, Sudan had a number of 
interests at stake in what is to become later 
South Sudan.  
 
Security was its overriding interest given 
Sudan’s fragile security at that time.15 Apart 
from the widely internationalized Darfur crisis, 
Khartoum had to deal with armed 
insurgencies in different parts of the country 
including in the Nuba Mountains, South 
Kordofan and Blue Niles areas. Some of these 
armed rebellions were closely affiliated with 
or supported by SPLA which by now had been 
in power in the South since 2006. Khartoum’s 
military and political triumph over these 
groups could only be ensured to the extent 
that the SPLA-led South Sudan is either 
unable or unwilling to support these groups. 
Therefore, Khartoum was considered to have 
an interest to ensure the realization of either 
of these scenarios. And Khartoum was 
alleged to have preferred the former in the 
past.16 Sudan also had (various) economic 
interests which it sought to maintain with the 
impending secession of the South. The most 
evident is the loss of oil revenue that 
Khartoum would incur as most of the oil fields 
were located in the South.  
 
In the case of both interests mentioned 
above, Sudan appeared to be bent on 
protecting its interests embracing a zero-sum 
posturing. In order to contain the threat from 
armed insurgents supported by SPLA, 
Khartoum was alleged to have preferred 
instability in South Sudan, which favors Sudan 
as a South Sudan embroiled in its own 
instability could not arm and support 
Khartoum’s opposition. This would allow 
Sudan’s various pro-government militias to 
freely continue recruitment among South 
 
15 The signing and implementation of the CPA were 
coterminous with the peak stages of the Darfur crisis. 
16 Interview with Juba based researcher, July 5, 2018. 
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Sudanese.17 Likewise, Khartoum sought to offset 
its loss of oil revenues, estimated to be about 
70% what it used to be prior to the secession of 
the South,  “by levying exorbitant oil 
transportation tariffs, process, and transit fees 
for exporting South Sudan’s crude through its 
pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast” 
(Kuol, 2018, p.2).  
 
Khartoum’s’ political interest is also worth 
examining. Given the intricate economic, 
security, political linkages, Khartoum was 
desirous of having a means that would allow it to 
continue exerting its influence in the South. 
Khartoum sought to achieve this by maintaining 
friendly South Sudanese elites closer to the helm 
of power in Juba. This was not difficult given 
Khartoum’s previous history which used to 
support certain factions in the South which had a 
fallout with the SPLA. A case in point was the 
support it provided to Riek Machar and Lam Akol 
in 1991 (Johnson, 2016). Sudan’s border politics 
with South Sudan also constitutes an important 
national interest consideration. This is because 
as the two countries were not able to resolve the 
issues involving some of the disputed border 
areas, including the oil-producing region of South 
Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei which were being 
administered by Sudan. As such, the status quo, 
symbolized by non-demarcation of the borders 
and was increasingly rendered unlikely to change 
anytime soon due to instability in South Sudan, 
would favor Khartoum. 
 
1.5. Patterning regional interests in South 
Sudan prior to the 2013 civil war 
During South Sudan’s pre-independence period, 
Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia maintained their 
own disparate as well as shared interests in 
Sudan. These interests defined their respective 
engagement with actors and issues within 
Sudan’s former territory that is now called South 
Sudan. The three countries had different forms 
of engagement in Sudan motivated by factors 
 
17 Interview with Juba based researcher, July 5, 2018. 
such as maintaining regional security, 
preventing spillover effects into neighboring 
nations, developing the economy in order to 
expand trading relationships, and developing 
internal national resources to stimulate 
economic growth, refugee and humanitarian 
assistance in order to bring an end to the 
devastation caused by the civil war (Schafer, 
2007).  
For Uganda, counter-balancing Sudan’s 
support to LRA as well as checking what it 
considered Khartoum’s drive to ‘Islamization 
and Arabization’ of the region motivated its 
military and diplomatic support to the 
rebellion in the South. Kampala’s support was 
also buttressed by moral-based arguments 
such as solidarity with marginalized and 
disfranchised population of the South. 
Ethiopia’s historical support to southern 
rebels was similarly underlain by 
consideration of offsetting Sudan’s influence 
and hegemony in the region which used to 
harbor and support most of Ethiopia’s 
insurgent groups. While Kenya sought to 
appear a neutral player, it was generally 
considered to be sympathetic to the 
“southern” cause, not least due to the political 
support it used to provide for the SPLA.   
Among the above-mentioned transversal set 
of interests, the three countries prioritized 
regional security, social-political 
considerations, the issue of refugees, and 
their support for self-determination in the 
South over and above the pursuit of their 
individual economic and other interests. In 
fact, economic interests, which are later to 
dominate the regional policies after the 
outbreak of the war, were not one of the top 
five priorities of these countries.18 Rather than 
dividing these three countries, individual 
national and collective regional interests 
/threat considerations were sufficiently 
 
18 Interview with Juba based researcher, Juba, July 5, 2018. 
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balanced and the latter consequently formed the 
minimum agreement that was needed to push 
for the conduct of the 2011 referendum in the 
South as envisaged by the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) and later for the 
ensuring South Sudan’s independence. While 
these countries had maintained different forms 
of interventions in the South, they were united 
more or less by their leaning or support to SPLM 
or politically, to calls for the self-determination of 
the South. This was critical in understanding why 
and how the region failed later to intervene as a 
unified actor in South Sudan after the 2013 
crisis. 
Quite naturally, Sudan is the exception to the 
above as it had a diametrically opposite and 
contending interests’ vis-a-vis the others. 
Sudan’s primary interest was to avert the 
looming secession of the South and to continue 
exerting its influence in the area. Nevertheless, 
Sudan’s interest and position, was increasingly 
weakened by its own internal contradictions 
such as armed rebellions in Darfur and other 
parts of the country as well as sustained 
pressure from the international community. The 
latter was in response to Khartoum’s support to 
international Islamic jihadist groups. 
Consequently, Sudan had failed to outweigh the 
influence, interests, and engagements of South 
Sudan’s other neighbors. An important question 
to ask at this juncture is to what extent the 
geometry of regional interests would change and 
what would the effect of these changes be 
following the outbreak of the South Sudanese 
civil war in 2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part Two 
 
2. Interventions by South Sudan’s 
neighboring countries during and after the 
2013 conflict  
 
Unlike the pre-independence and early 
independence period, each of South Sudan’s 
neighboring countries jockeyed their own 
disparate interests following the outbreak of 
the 2013 civil war. Clear divergence in regional 
interests in South Sudan became a defining 
feature of the time. In some cases, parochial 
economic interests trumped/ came at the 
expense of what could be considered the 
interests of peace in South Sudan. As such, 
the noble idea of peace in South Sudan and 
saving South Sudanese from the scourge of 
violence failed to serve as the basis for 
forging “minimum collective agreement” 
among countries in the region. This section 
provides a country by country analysis of the 
interests and modes of intervention of South 
Sudan’s neighbors to illustrate the above 
argument. 
 
2.1. Uganda  
 
Arguably, Uganda had the most conspicuous 
form of direct and partisan intervention in the 
South Sudan crisis. It sent its soldiers within 
72 hours of the first fighting in Juba. The 
intervention had the clear impact of saving 
Juba being overrun by opposition forces. 
Initially, Uganda’s intervention received the 
region’s support on the grounds that “it would 
stop further bloodshed given the imminent 
attack of the capital by opposition forces” 
(Johnson, 2016, p.72). The Ugandan 
government had advanced a number of 
reasons for its intervention. As aptly 
summarized by the Ugandan scholar Philip K. 
Apuuli (2014), these justifications include 
invitation by the legitimate government of 
South Sudan to ensure order; evacuation of 
Ugandan citizens caught up in the fighting; 
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request by the United Nations Secretary-General 
to intervene; and sanctions by the regional 
organization IGAD.  
 
Despite these justifications, the intervention was 
increasingly questioned on its intent, process 
and legality. Though the intention initially could 
be well-meaning to “stop the bloodshed, the 
anarchy and the death of many more South 
Sudanese”, Uganda appeared a biased and 
partisan actor, at least in the eyes of those who 
did not necessarily view the crisis from the prism 
of political rivalry but rather from an ethnic one.19 
Especially, this did not bode well among the 
South Sudanese who historically viewed Uganda 
as their second home and President Youeri 
Museveni as a fatherly figure for his support to 
the country’s independence.20 
 
The intervention was also questionable 
procedurally, particularly for lacking the prior 
consent of Uganda’s parliament.21 A Ugandan 
scholar interviewed for this study characterized 
the process as follows:  
It was a unilateral decision (by the president) that 
was rubberstamped by the parliament after the 
fact (the intervention) as the president asked 
parliament’s approval after the Ugandan soldiers 
were already in South Sudan. Alternatively, the 
President could have called for an emergency 
cabinet meeting to approve the decision and this 
did not happen either. In any case, it was one-man 
decision taken without the prior consent of the 
parliament.22  
 
Similarly, the legality of the intervention also 
became a subject of debate. Kassaja Phililp 
Apuuli (2014) interrogated the issue and 
concluded that while Uganda’s (limited) 
 
19 Interview with a veteran diplomat of the region, Addis Ababa, July 
25, 2018. 
20 Interview with Juba based researcher, Juba, July 5, 2018. 
21 Ugandan Parliament endorsed the deployment on January 14 
after government said UPDF was there to facilitate evacuation of 
stranded Ugandans and secure critical South Sudan state 
installations, including Juba Airport (Butagira, 2014). 
22 Interview with a veteran diplomat of the region, Addis Ababa, July 
25, 2018. 
engagement could be justified emanating 
from the request of the South Sudan 
government, the participation of Ugandan 
troops [in fighting on the side of the Kiir 
government] further renders the intervention 
illegal. 
 
Rather than the above-mentioned 
justifications, the actual motivations behind 
Uganda’s controversial move are to be found 
in the historical, security, political and 
economic interests that Uganda sought to 
protect by sustaining the regime in Juba 
(Berouk Mesfin, 2015). Some of these 
interests (security and political ones) are pre-
existing historically and others (economic 
considerations) were recently ‘discovered’ and 
nurtured, especially since establishment of 
the GoSS in 2006. 
 
Politically, it could be argued that a major 
intent was preserving the status quo and pre-
empting the establishment of a Khartoum 
friendly government in Juba that would not 
allow Kampala to exert its economic/political 
influence in South Sudan. With Dr. Riek 
Machar, as the public face of the rebellion and 
as someone who had previous history of 
close relationship with Khartoum, this 
argument is not to be discounted easily.  
 
Security interests were also at play. The LRA 
had been weakened throughout the years 
increasingly due to sustained campaigns by 
Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) as 
well as by regional and international actors 
(such as the Regional Cooperation Initiative 
for the Elimination of the LRA [RCI-LRA]). 
South Sudan had been a key player in this 
regard both in terms of its bilateral 
arrangements with Kampala and as part of 
the regional coalition. As one analyst alluded, 
continued instability, total state collapse, or a 
Khartoum friendly government in South 
Sudan were all likely scenarios that would 
resuscitate LRA and enable it to launch 
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attacks on Uganda.23 Uganda needed to make 
sure this was not happening. 
 
For some analysts, such as Kassaja Phililp 
Apuuli (2014), economic considerations provide 
a stronger explanation behind Uganda’s overt 
support of the government in an otherwise 
internal conflict. As shown in part one, Uganda 
has a lot of economic interests in South Sudan 
that it needed to protect including its boosting 
bilateral trade and investments by its citizens. In 
fact, the Ugandan Parliament endorsed the 
deployment of UPDF, after the fact, to facilitate 
evacuation of stranded Ugandans and secure 
critical South Sudan state installations, including 
Juba Airport (Butagira, 2014).  
 
Apart from this otherwise seemingly legitimate 
consideration, speculations also abound that 
Uganda had been receiving payment for its 
military services in Juba. Some media reports 
confirmed these allegations citing South Sudan’s 
defence minister Kuol Manyang Juuk, who 
confirmed that “We (South Sudan) are funding all 
activities of UPDF and SPLA (Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army)”(Butagira, 2014). Although 
difficult to establish the exact amount paid to 
Uganda, the issue amplified the suspicion that 
Uganda was primarily pursuing financial and 
economic motives in South Sudan.  
 
Paradoxically, Uganda’s unilateral military 
intervention foreshadowed its engagement in the 
regional mediation efforts. Increasingly, 
Uganda’s military intervention was considered as 
“the most damning” from the perspective of the 
interests of regional states that complicated the 
peace process (Vertin, 2018, p.9). As a country 
that had troops on the ground fighting alongside 
government forces, Uganda was rightly 
considered a party to the conflict. In addition, the 
Ugandan government was providing support to 
controversial political initiatives such as Juba’s 
national dialogue process and convening of early 
 
23 Interview with South Sudanese university lecturer, Juba, July 5, 
2018. 
national elections, even as the crisis was still 
unfolding in various forms (Kuol, 2018). Thus 
its participation in the IGAD mediation 
process, though it was not playing a lead role, 
was difficult to accept for many South 
Sudanese.24 But more ominous was the 
regional confrontation that was in the making 
due to the Ugandan military intervention, 
especially with Sudan. As one-time UN SRSG 
Hilde Johnson (2016, p.273) stated, coupled 
with Juba’s use of Darfurian rebel fighters 
from the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) to fight SPLM-IO, there was an 
imminent internationalization of the crisis as 
Uganda’s “engagement could prompt Sudan 
to enter the conflict on Machar’s side”. 
 
2.2. Ethiopia 
 
Along with other neighboring countries, 
Ethiopia early in the crisis became part of the 
IGAD peacemaking initiative which kicked off 
in December 2013. With two other emissaries 
from Kenya and Sudan, Ethiopia’s former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seyoum Mesfin, 
was appointed as IGAD’s Special Envoy for 
South Sudan. Addis Ababa became the venue 
of successive peace talks throughout the 
crisis. Side by side with its role in the 
peacemaking track, Ethiopia continued its 
already existing peacekeeping engagement in 
South Sudan both through UNISFA and 
UNMISS. In the latter, Ethiopia progressively 
expanded its presence numerically and 
diversified its contingent following the 
outbreak of the civil war in 2013. Ethiopia, as a 
country sharing a long border with South 
Sudan and which had hitherto only 
contributed individual police officers, upped 
its role in UNMISS in order to curtail the 
spillover effects of the crisis in its territory.25 
Ethiopia deployed two battalions of military 
 
24 Interview with South Sudanese university lecturer, Juba, July 
5, 2018. 
25 Skype interview with a former UNMISS police officer, July 20, 
2018 
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contingent to UNMISS covering areas of 
operations including Jonglei and Upper Nile 
States which are bordering Ethiopia’s Gambella 
National Regional State. 
 
Ethiopia’s engagement in the crisis were 
underpinned by a set of considerations, national 
and regional security being the most prominent 
ones. The security implications, especially for 
Ethiopia’s restive Gambella region, had been well 
known. Geographic proximity and ethnic ties, 
especially the presence of the Nuer on both 
sides of the border, meant that the crisis could 
easily spill over to Gambella. This became 
increasingly ominous as the ethnic dimension of 
the South Sudan crisis was evident almost from 
its onset. At the peak of the crisis, the increasing 
influx of refugees, most of them Nuers, to the 
Gambella region were considered as likely 
factors that fuel “the already existing tension not 
only between the Anuak and the Nuer but also 
between the Anuak political organizations and 
the Ethiopian government” (Dereje Feyssa, 
2014). This is on top of other consequences for 
Ethiopia’s Gambella region, which included 
heightened competition over natural resources 
and public health risks such as measles and to a 
lesser extent Ebola. Given the strong ethnic 
undertone of the crisis, there were also signs of 
cross border mobilization among Ethiopian 
Nuers in support of their ethnic kin on the other 
side. Dereje further argued, politically, this would 
be a strong challenge to the Ethiopian 
government’s official policy of neutrality in the 
South Sudan crisis. 
 
Concerns for regional security and its impacts 
on its own interests were also behind Ethiopia’s 
engagement in the crisis. Ethiopia, which was 
already deeply involved in Somalia almost with 
no end in sight, would not want to have similar 
predicament on its western frontiers that would 
demand its engagement or would affect its 
interests in one way or another. Ethiopia was 
also well aware of the implicit implications of the 
changing patterns of the regional alliances which 
ebb and flow with the conflict dynamics in 
South Sudan. In this case, Ethiopia was wary 
of emergence of a possible coalition between 
the South Sudan and Egypt that would 
jeopardize the regional alliance it had nurtured 
in the context of cooperation on the use of the 
waters of the River Nile. Rumors fueling these 
suspicions abound at the time. Most worrying 
to Addis Ababa were those alluding that Egypt 
had acquired a military base in South Sudan 
which would enable it to launch aerial attacks 
on strategic interests in Ethiopia, importantly 
on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
(GERD).26 Similarly, the Ethiopian engagement 
was driven by concern to counterbalance 
Eritrean influence in South Sudan, which was 
alleged to be covertly providing support to 
opposition forces (Berouk Mesfin, 2015). 
 
Despite its self-perception as a neutral 
regional player, Ethiopia’s involvement in 
South Sudan was not without controversy, 
although not to the level comparable to other 
neighboring countries such as Uganda and 
Sudan and to a lesser extent Kenya. 
Especially, handling of its mediation roles was 
a subject of criticism: for example on the 
choice of the mediation venue; contest to 
leadership of the peace process with Kenya 
and importantly on the approach followed by 
the team (Johnson, 2016). In the latter sense, 
Johnson highlighted that there were 
criticisms at the outset, regarding Seyoum 
Mesfin’s emergence as a Chief Mediator who 
had made important decisions on strategy, 
even though no provisions existed for that.27 
In terms of approach to mediation, Seyoum 
was criticized by the South Sudanese side for 
dictating the negotiations. This came in 
apparent response to his perhaps well-
 
26 GERD has been a source of controversy between the two 
countries as Egypt initially claimed the construction of the dam 
would lead to reduction of its water share from the Nile River. 
27 Without providing specific details, Veritn (2018, p.4) also 
alluded that Seyoum had made early tactical mistakes which 
made apparent that he, despite his credentials at home and 
abroad, had less mediation experience than many had 
assumed.  
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intentioned statement that “negotiators from the 
government and the rebels would not leave 
Ethiopia without reaching a peace deal by 17 
August (2015)” (South Sudan Accuses IGAD 
Chief Mediator of ‘Dictating’ Negotiations, 2015).  
President Kiir had earlier echoed a similar 
sentiment (of being coerced) claiming that he 
had signed the May 9th 2015 agreement under 
duress as Ethiopia’s prime minister, Hailemariam 
Desalegn, threatened to arrest him should he fail 
to sign the deal (S. Sudanese rebel leader decries 
president Kiir’s remarks on peace agreements 
2014). Such criticisms, most often by members 
of the South Sudanese government, seemed to 
tie into an existing perception that Ethiopia was 
leaning in its support towards the opposition. 
Though these are no conclusive indications, the 
latter came due to allegation that some SPLM-IO 
fighters were found to be carrying Ethiopian 
national IDs and passports and Addis Ababa had 
hosted Riek Machar on a number of occasions.28  
 
2.3. Kenya 
 
Striking similarities exist in the way both Kenya 
and Ethiopia had been engaging with the South 
Sudan crisis. As in the case of Ethiopia, it played 
a role in the regional mediation appointing CPA 
veteran General Lazaro Sumbeiywo as an envoy 
to the IGAD peace process. Until the withdrawal 
of its contingent in November 2016, Kenya was 
part of the UN peacekeeping contingent in South 
Sudan (UNMISS). Like Ethiopia, Kenya had an 
official policy of keeping its neutrality in the 
conflict. However, there were moments during 
which Kenya was perceived to have crossed its 
position of neutrality. The ‘red carpet treatment’ 
Nairobi offered to Dr. Riek Machar in May 2014 
had upset the South Sudanese government 
considering it was tantamount to recognizing an 
opposition government formed in exile (South 
Sudan: Kenyan MPs Criticize Kenyatta Over 'Red 
Carpet' Reception, 2014). Conversely, the arrest 
and repatriation of Gen. Peter Gadet, 
 
28 Interview with a former South Sudan diplomat, Juba, July 6, 
2018. 
spokesperson of SPLM-IO in Nairobi in 
November 2016, gave the impression that 
Kenya was unduly leaning to the government 
(Kenya deports South Sudan rebel leader’s 
spokesman to Juba, 2016). 
 
Kenya also shared similar concerns with 
Ethiopia regarding the humanitarian and 
security consequences of the refugee crisis 
emerging from the civil war in South Sudan. 
Kenya, overburdened with its humanitarian 
obligations of hosting Somali refugees in 
camps such as Daddab, was also home to 
many South Sudanese. Refugee influx would 
have adverse impacts and consequences 
including straining of resources and service 
delivery and compromising national and 
regional security not least as it would 
exacerbate security and proliferation of illegal 
small arms and light weapons (Odhiambo and 
Muluvi, 2014). Local level security concerns 
were also prevalent in areas bordering Kenya 
with South Sudan. Growing economic 
interests including booming prospects of 
infrastructure projects along with the safety of 
its citizens in South Sudan and their property 
was, however, considered as Kenya’s 
priority.29  
 
2.4. Sudan 
 
Shared social ties and previous history of 
common statehood and violent conflict 
underlie Sudan’s engagement and interests in 
South Sudan, including in the context of the 
2013 crisis. As a close neighbor with intricate 
linkages with Juba, Sudan had to juggle a 
combination of political, security and 
economic interests in its engagement in 
South Sudan’s civil war. In terms of 
geopolitical considerations, Khartoum needed 
to find ways of fending off Kampala’s 
influence in South Sudan, especially given 
 
29
 Interview with a veteran diplomat of the region, Addis Ababa, July 
25, 2018. 
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Uganda’s active role in the crisis. Particularly, 
Sudan was wary that Uganda’s presence would 
weaken its own influence and deprive its political 
or financial benefits (Berouk Mesfin, 2015). 
According to Berouk Mesfin, the latter were 
amplified at a point when Ugandan forces were 
deployed close to the oil fields in South Sudan’s 
Unity and Upper Nile states causing great anxiety 
in Sudan regarding Kampala’s real intentions. 
With one eye traded on Uganda, Khartoum had 
also to keep a close view of politics in Juba to 
ensure that its ongoing interests were not 
compromised. This was intended to “keeping 
tabs on developments there (Juba) if not also to 
weaken the South” (Kuol, 2018, p.4). 
 
Sudan’s regional rivalry with Uganda in South 
Sudan had also security implications for 
Khartoum. In this regard, deepening of rivalry 
with Uganda was a source of major concern for 
Khartoum, lest Uganda would provide weapons 
to Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition 
of armed groups opposed to Sudan (Berouk 
Mesfin, 2015). Such a scenario would exacerbate 
Khartoum’s security predicament, which was 
already marked by a complex network of 
insurgencies in Darfur, Nuba Mountain, South 
Kordofan, and Blue Nile. All these conflicts, 
including the South Sudan civil war, were 
interlinked in one way or another; and Khartoum, 
as a protagonist in most of them, had to have a 
good handle of things.  
 
Further, Sudan had a number of economic and 
business interests that it had to protect in South 
Sudan, though the most obvious one was oil. In 
some ways, a prolonged conflict in South Sudan 
would benefit Khartoum. This is more valid in the 
case of interruption of South Sudan’s support for 
insurgences in Sudan, notably to those fighting 
in and around their shared borders. After all, 
South Sudan embroiled in its own internal crisis 
would not be able to support groups such as 
SPLM-N. Likewise, South Sudan, amidst its own 
difficulties, would not be in a position to find 
lasting solution to issues surrounding the 
disputed border areas as provided by the CPA. 
Some of these areas are under Sudan’s 
control, thus the status quo would favor 
Khartoum. At the same time, continuation of 
the crisis had also adverse economic 
implications. With biting economic difficulties 
at home, Khartoum would stand to lose 
additionally from the interruption of oil 
production in South Sudan as a result of the 
civil war. 
 
Therefore, different dimensions of Khartoum’s 
engagement in South Sudan’s civil war need 
to be understood in such contending contexts 
whereby certain scenarios would favor 
Sudan’s interests and others may not possibly 
do so. Reflecting these intricacies, Sudan 
maintained its rather complex engagement in 
South Sudan broadly marked by engagement 
in, and public support for, diplomatic efforts of 
ending the crisis on the one hand and 
implicitly by vacillating support to parties to 
the conflict on the other hand. For some 
observers, part of Khartoum’s complex 
engagement was its preference for 
continuation of the crisis which was based on 
real-poltik calculation of safeguarding its 
interest by following a policy of 
destabilization.30 In this vein, a 2014 ISS 
analysis of regional interests in the South 
Sudan crisis opined:  
 
In the short and medium terms, such a civil war 
would present the extraordinary opportunity of 
preventing the emergence of a stronger and oil-
rich state allied to Uganda and it would allow 
Sudan to reestablish its traditional influence 
over South Sudanese politics characterized by 
increased polarization (Berouk Mesfin, 2014). 
 
Hilde Johnson one-time UNSRSG in South 
Sudan, echoed a similar sentiment possibly 
attesting to Sudan’s desire for a prolonged 
crisis in the South. Johnson (2016, p.274) 
stated that “Sudan was the only IGAD 
 
30 Interview with a Ugandan scholar, Kampala, July 13, 2018. 
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member state the seemed to be in no rush to 
reach an agreement during the regional peace 
talks”. She added that Sudan’s leadership 
advocated giving the parties more times, though 
the Sudanese government was publicly 
expressing deep concerns about developments 
on the ground.  
 
Despite joining the mediation process, Khartoum 
had also maintained vacillating support to 
government and to opposition forces. 
Khartoum’s initial leaning to President Salva Kiir 
was alleged to have been reversed in light of the 
conflict dynamics, notably the use of Sudan’s 
rebel forces in the South Sudan civil war. 
Emblematic of old tactics of using local militias 
prevalent in the Sudan, South Sudan was alleged 
to have solicited the support of JEM and SPLM-
N to fight alongside government forces (Machar 
forces claim Sudanese rebels backing 
government forces, 2016). For Khartoum, which 
was probably playing both sides up to mid/end 
of 2014, the role and presence of these rebel 
groups in South Sudan was unsettling and must 
have promoted its increasing tilt towards 
Machar’s camp. In this regard, documents from 
London-based Armament Research as well as 
confidential reports citing security meetings in 
Khartoum had confirmed cases of Khartoum’s 
support for the opposition including direct 
airdrops of weapons and ammunition from 
Sudan to SPLM-IO (Johnson, 2016).   
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
Taking the different cases together, we observe 
that the respective interests and threat 
considerations of South Sudan’s neighbors 
significantly diverged following the outbreak of 
the 2013 crisis. Largely as a reflection of the 
internal dynamics of the conflict and 
(mis)calculated preference of South Sudanese 
belligerents which favor their respective self-
interests, some of the countries in the region 
took sides in supporting one or the other conflict 
party. Unlike the period predating South Sudan’s 
independence, historical and immediate self-
interests took primacy in the respective 
calculations of the neighboring countries over 
and above the idea of peace in South Sudan. 
Importantly, the often subtle and at times 
overt partisan positions of Sudan and Uganda 
rearranged the matrix of regional interests in 
South Sudan. On their part, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, both having significant business and 
economic interests as well as citizens in 
South Sudan appeared to maintain a neutral 
stance in the crisis and took center stage in 
mediating the conflict. Nevertheless, both 
countries were criticized for lending subtle 
support for different conflict parties (Ethiopia 
to be pro-SPLM IO and Kenya for being pro-
Former Detainees). As such, the pursuit of 
one’s own business, economic, and political 
interests featured high in the neighboring 
countries’ engagement in South Sudan. 
Failure to reach timely conclusion of the crisis 
and the inability of regional actors to enforce 
agreements fueled the suspicion that 
neighboring countries had vested interest in 
the conflict and had become part of what 
some South Sudanese scholars called 
economically motivated ‘scramble for South 
Sudan’.31 Consequently, conflict parties used 
divergent regional interests to their own 
advantage with the clear consequence of 
prolonging the conflict. Such contestations 
and competing interests were to have their 
direct impact on resolving the crisis. The next 
section will examine this issue in relation to 
the peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 Interview with South Sudanese university lecturer, Juba, July 
5, 2018. 
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Part Three 
 
3. National Interests, Neighbors Interventions and 
Implications for Peacekeeping in South Sudan 
 
The South Sudan civil war and the attendant 
efforts of making peace in the country unfolded 
in the face of immense international attention 
and scrutiny. The tragic story of a country, which 
just got independence and swiftly descended 
into a horrifying chaos, became a narrative which 
many observers could relate with remorse for 
failing to act once again, whether as a region or 
as part of the wider international community. As 
shown in the previous section, an important 
corollary of this story was the role of neighbors 
and their national interest driven interventions in 
South Sudan following the crisis in 2013.   
 
In the context of the interest driven regional 
interventions, it is worthwhile to highlight some 
key points from a few existing analyses that 
linked neighbors’ interests, their interventions, 
and implications on the peacekeeping mission. 
An ISS Research Report published in 2014 needs 
to be highlighted, especially for pointing out the 
roles of these countries in changing the course 
of the conflict. The report states that “these 
regional states have actually changed the 
complexion of the crisis that broke out in 
December 2013 by openly joining the crisis, by 
secretly making opportunistic alliances with the 
two militarily balanced sides or by separately 
and together trying to mediate the crisis” (Berouk 
Mesfin, 2015, p.7). Similarly, in terms of shaping 
the trajectory of peace missions, notably the 
IGAD mediation, a report published by IPI in April 
2018 alluded to remorseful statement from 
Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia’s Special Envoy to the 
IGAD Mediation stating that national interests 
had “prevailed over IGAD’s regional common 
interest and left IGAD in paralysis.” A stronger 
and more united region,” the chief mediator later 
lamented, “would have paved the way for AU and 
UN action” (Vertin, 2018, p.17).  
 
A common thread within the above and other 
similar analyses is the conflictual nature of 
regional interests in South Sudan and how 
that adversely impacted the quest for peace 
broadly both in mediation and peacekeeping. 
In essence, lack of consensus among the 
different countries as well as failure to follow 
through agreed upon decision had 
continuously sent mixed/wrong signals to the 
parties on the ground. Consequently, parties 
to the conflict leveraged divergent regional 
interests in sustaining the conflict (including 
by receiving military and political support from 
some of the neighboring countries). Among 
others, this resulted in the delay in striking a 
binding peace agreement and later in the lack 
of the collective political will to enforce the 
same.  
 
The above has a direct consequence in 
weakening the overall function of the 
peacekeeping mission to the extent that 
peacekeeping missions are generally 
conceived as ultimately operating towards an 
overarching political goal which took quite 
some time to establish in the case of South 
Sudan. In this vein, two specific dimensions 
are worth highlighting. The first and more 
direct implication refers to delayed 
deployment of the Regional Protection Force 
that was intended to create an enabling 
environment implementation of the 
Agreement (UNSC, 2016). The second, more 
indirect and broader implication pertains to 
the mandate and operations of UNMISS.  
 
3.1. Implications on the timeline of 
deployment, intent, and tasks of the Regional 
Protection Force (RPF) 
The UNSC, through Resolution 2304 (2016), 
authorized the deployment of RPF on 12 
August 2016. The authorization came at the 
back of an earlier decision by the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
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(IGAD) which was later endorsed by the AU 
Assembly on 18 July 2016. The Force was 
authorized with the broader objective of creating 
“an enabling environment for implementation of 
the Agreement” (UNSC, 2016, § 10). Within this 
broader mandate, its various tasks include: 
facilitation of free movement into, out of, and 
around Juba; protection of the Juba airport and 
other key facilities in the city, and promptly and 
effectively engaging any actor that was credibly 
deemed to be preparing to or engaged in 
attacking UN POC sites, other UN premises, UN 
personnel, humanitarian actors, and civilians.  
When authorizing the RPF with a force strength 
of 4000 troops, the UNSC Resolution 2304 
(2016, §13) had urged countries in the region “to 
expedite contributions of rapidly deployable 
troops to ensure the full deployment of the 
Regional Protection Force as soon as possible”. 
Nevertheless, the deployment of the RPF was 
ostensibly delayed. Despite its authorization in 
August 2016 and initial consent to the protection 
force as early as a year before (September 
2015), the first troops did not arrive before 
August 2017 (South Sudan: Deployment of UN-
mandated regional protection force begins, 
2017). The reluctance of the South Sudanese 
government had been a major factor behind the 
delay both on technical grounds such as forging 
armament agreements and timeline of 
deployment but at times citing sovereignty 
based political arguments. For instance, the 
deployment of the protection force at the Juba 
airport had been a controversial issue, though it 
was stipulated in the binding UNSC Resolution 
2034 (South Sudan, UN argue over protection 
force mandate, 2017).  
Analysts had also cited South Sudanese 
government’s perception of the interests of its 
neighbors as one more reason behind the 
reluctance for the deployment of the RPF, or at 
least for its delay. In this regard, South Sudan 
government was mentioned as being critical of 
the idea of neighboring states deploying in the 
RPF (Williams, 2016). As such, possible 
entanglement of neighbors’ interest in South 
Sudan not only affected the timeline of the 
mission’s deployment, but as we are to see 
later, its force composition. Some countries in 
East Africa had already contributed to 
peacekeeping operations in South Sudan but 
South Sudan’s government had initially 
rejected the involvement of any neighboring 
countries in the RPF, which rules out military 
power from Ethiopia and Kenya (as well as 
Uganda) (Analyst questions whether UN 
‘protection force’ in Juba will be effective. 
n.d.). 
Overall, controversy over regional interests in 
South Sudan had its own practical 
implications on the course of the RPF which 
was conceived to be integral part of the 
existing UNMISS mission. One clear impact is 
the exclusion of three of the neighboring 
countries analyzed in this study. Previous 
‘history’ of national interest-based 
involvement in South Sudan was cited for 
rejecting the participation of some 
neighboring countries in the RPF notably 
Uganda and Sudan. Particularly, the 
deployment of troops from the two countries, 
arguably strongly self-interested in the 
conflict, was deemed as contravention of the 
impartiality principle of UN peacekeeping 
(Jewish World Watch, 2016). This in turn was 
instrumental in watering down the political will 
and appetite to deploy the RPF, especially in 
the eyes of the South Sudanese government.  
There was also lack of countries in the region 
that could send troops expediently for the 
robust ‘protection force’. Kenya had already 
withdrawn its forces from South Sudan over 
the dismissal of the Kenyan Force 
Commander of UNMISS. Ethiopian troops 
were only deployed in 2018 due to delays on 
technical ground.  
But importantly, the RPF was deployed in 
August 2017, ostensibly after it had 
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significantly lost its momentum and to an extent 
its relevance and the Force could not be used for 
the intent and purposes that was originally 
meant by the UNSC resolution 2304 and the 
IGAD decision that preceded it. When the RPF 
was finally allowed to deploy, conditions on the 
grounds had changed and the protection 
purpose it meant to serve had significantly 
evolved. For example, its presence in Juba was 
considered as futile as the force was needed 
more outside of the capital (Voice of America, 
2018). In due course, the RPF ended up serving 
purposes that are similar with the pre-existing 
UNMISS mission in the country.32 Calls to review 
the mandate and tasks of the RPF speak mainly 
to its ambivalent mandates. The South 
Sudanese government had requested for 
revisiting the mandate of the protection force 
citing “there is no further threat of violence in the 
capital Juba following last year's clashes 
between rival forces” (South Sudan wants 
mandate of UN peacekeeping force reviewed, 
2018). 
3.2. Implications on UNMISS 
The implications of divergent regional interests 
on the pre-existing UN mission (UNMISS) is 
more indirect, mainly arising out of inability to 
resolve the crisis in part due to divergent regional 
interests. More generally, UNMISS, the UN 
mission whose mandate evolved to protecting 
civilians fleeing from the abuses by the conflict 
parties, had difficulty in fully carrying out its 
mandates. UNMISS was facing frequent 
impediments by host government, which was at 
times hostile to the mission.33 In addition, the 
mission lacked the robust and unified political 
support from the UNSC in enforcing sanction on 
violators of peace agreements, even in the face 
of direct attacks to the mission itself.34 This 
 
32 Telephone interview with security expert at an international 
organization, October 10, 2018. 
33 Itself caught under fire between the conflict, the UN mission had 
to deal at times with a hostile host government, which accused it 
being participant in the crisis (Johnson, 2016). 
34 Faced with this environment, UNMISS has received inadequate 
political and material support, particularly from the Security Council. 
could, in part, be attributed to lack of unified 
action from the region that would have 
translated into binding UNSC decisions and 
actions.  
As the war lingered on, not least abetted by 
lack of concerted regional action alluded 
earlier, UNMISS had to bear the brunt of the 
crisis and had to cater for immense 
expectations on it. Among other things, it was 
increasingly difficult for the mission to fully 
address the protection needs of the civilian 
population. The mission had a difficult 
relationship with the host government and as 
such it had to grapple with continued 
obstruction by the South Sudanese 
government. The latter included severe 
restrictions on freedom of movement and 
constraints on mission operations (UNSC, 
2016). This precluded the mission, for 
example, from undertaking some of its major 
tasks including human rights observations 
and investigations as defined in its mandate.35  
In addition, the continued violence in the 
country and the expanding space it conquered 
severely contributed to a persistent 
prevalence of massive human rights violation. 
This further created the conditions in which a 
significant section of civilian population 
needed protection. By mid-2018, the mission 
was administering five Protection of Civilians 
(POC) sites, hosting about 200,000 South 
Sudanese. Therefore, the mission needed to 
have a preponderant focus on the protection 
of civilians under threat of physical violence 
utilizing its POC camps36, as opposed to more 
 
After three years of the parties using weapons, including heavy 
weapons, against civilians – and after the Council threatened 
sanctions if the government continued to impede the Mission– 
there is no arms embargo. UNMISS has come under deserved 
criticism for its performance, but it has too often been a 
scapegoat as the parties to the conflict, South Sudan’s regional 
neighbors and the Security Council have been unwilling or 
unable to halt atrocities or hold accountable those responsible 
(Wells, 2017).   
35 Telephone interview with security expert at an international 
organization, October 10, 2018. 
36 UN POC sites are located in Juba, Malakal, Wau, Bor, and 
Bentiu 
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than 2 million populations outside these camps 
that require its protection. An expert informant 
claims that the mission was reaching out only to 
10% of the population that requires its 
protection. While its POC mandate extends in the 
broader sense, its existing focus appeared to be 
skewed to handling the IDP situation of those in 
the camps.37 A recent interview with an 
international NGO expert familiar with the work 
of the UNMISS, echoed a much earlier 
observation by Stimson Center that UN troops 
were “consumed by the immediate issue of 
protecting civilians from attacks by government 
forces and other armed factions in and around 
the POC sites” (World Peace Foundation, 2017). 
But more ominously, according to WPF (2017, 
p.59) the overall POC functions of the mission 
appeared to had been decoupled from 
overarching political strategies to “creating 
political conditions in which civilians live”. This 
was more evident as the mission was operating 
for the major part with a POC mandate but in the 
absence of viable peace agreement.  
3.3. Final conclusion and recommendation 
In its conclusion, this research report reaffirms 
existing observations regarding neighbors’ 
potential and posturing to play contending roles 
in sustaining and ending conflicts. Alignment of 
national and regional security interests or at 
least convergence on common objective of 
furthering the South Sudan independence had 
been a unifying factor for Ethiopia, Kenya, and 
Uganda in the 1990s and 2000’s. During this 
period, the need for regulation/security both in 
regional and national contexts figured higher 
than any other interests in South Sudan. South 
Sudan’s independence and the country’s 
enlarged economic value later made it a point of 
regional contestation. As a newly discovered 
‘periphery/fringe territory’ in the region with 
 
37 In parallel to barriers to translating security warnings into action, 
UNMISS has also faced challenges in supporting IDP returns, in part 
because UN troops are consumed by the immediate issue of 
protecting civilians from attacks by government forces and other 
armed factions in and around the PoC sites (Stimson Report cited in 
World Peace Foundation, 2017).  
immense economic potentials, South Sudan’s 
own interests including its stability in and by 
itself mattered less to some of its neighbors 
but to the extent as defined by the regional 
power centers or competing hegemons. The 
outbreak of civil war in South Sudan set the 
stage not only for bitter competition among 
key South Sudanese belligerents but also the 
bifurcation of regional interests. The latter 
came especially against the backdrop of 
decades long regional rivalry between Sudan 
and Uganda and pursuit of newly found 
economic self-interests almost by all the 
neighbors. As observed in the previous parts, 
divergence of regional interests had 
convoluted various attempts of making peace 
in South Sudan including the trajectories of 
the regional mediation and the peacekeeping 
mission.  
In the final analysis, it became increasingly 
evident that neighboring countries are indeed 
unavoidable actors for peace, as they were in 
the civil war in South Sudan. This conclusion 
is in line with an earlier observation by the 
World Peace Foundation based on a 
consultation on ‘Regional Protection Force’ 
(RPF) for South Sudan. As one of the major 
lessons of two years of civil war, the policy 
memo produced by the WPF concluded “the 
unavoidable political interests of the 
neighboring states in the internal politics of 
South Sudan should be recognized and 
accommodated” (Sarkar, 2016).   
From a policy perspective, therefore, the crux 
of the matter lies in finding creative and 
contextually rooted peacekeeping policies 
that strike the required balance between the 
self-interests of countries in the neighborhood 
and the collective regional quest for peace in 
a given context. Among others, the above 
requires the deliberate engagement of 
neighboring countries not just in the context 
of regional blocs (such as IGAD) but in a wider 
platform which could potentially sermon key 
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global and regional players such as UNSC and 
AU PSC members.  
Design and implementation of future peace 
missions in such contexts in Africa thus shall be 
based on multiple but simultaneously unfolding 
interventions. First regional mediations, which 
include front line states in any given context, 
need to give space not just for belligerents but 
also for mediating the interests of the 
neighboring countries. With participation of extra 
regional actors, such regional mediation strives 
to create a ‘good enough’ regional agreement 
involving the necessary trade-off between self-
interest and quest for peace in the 
neighborhood. The creation of regional norms 
reflecting this agreement is helpful than opening 
the space for such negotiations every time a 
crisis arises in the region. Some suggestive 
elements of such norms include reaffirmation of 
impartiality in a given conflict as well as finding 
ways of safeguarding economic, political, 
security and other interests in the course of 
crisis. 
Side by side, peacekeeping missions, whether in 
the traditional sense or entailing more peace 
enforcement functions, need to include 
neighboring countries whose interests by now is 
recognized, accommodated and regulated within 
the regional mediation process through the 
above mentioned agreement. Resource 
mobilization, monitoring and evaluation of the 
mandate implementation and overall progress of 
such peacekeeping missions shall rest not just 
with the sub-regional organizations (RECs/RM) 
but with the AU and other international players 
such as the UN, EU, and other relevant actors. 
Short of such deliberate strategies, neighbors 
will continue to project the classical catch 22 
situation vacillating between unavoidable actors 
for peace and spoilers. 
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